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Abstract
In this paper a new electronic voting scheme is described
which guarantees coercion-resistance as well as privacy, eli-
gibility, unreusability and verifiability. The proposed protocol
can be implemented in practical environment, since it does not
require untappable channel or voting booth, only anonymous
channels are applied.
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1 Introduction
The research on electronic voting is a very important topic for
the progress of democracy. If a secure and convenient electronic
voting system is provided, it will be used more frequently to
collect people’s opinion for many kinds of political and social
decisions through cyber space. Traditional paper-based voting
can be time consuming and inconvenient. Electronic voting not
only accelerate the whole process, but makes it less expensive
and more comfortable for the voters and the authorities as well.
It also reduces the chances of errors. Electronic voting schemes
should provide all basic features that conventional voting does,
further should furnish more services in order to make the process
more trusted and secure.
Many extensive researches have been conducted on the sub-
ject. The literature provides three basic cryptographic ap-
proaches for secure electronic voting.
Voting schemes based on homomorphic encryption. Let PT
be the plaintext space and CT the ciphertext space such that
PT is a group under the operation⊕ and CT is a group under
the operation ⊗. Let Er (m) denote encryption of the mes-
sage m using random parameter r . An encryption scheme
is (⊗,⊕)-homomorphic, if for given c1 = Er1(m1) and
c2 = Er2(m2), there exists an r such that
c1 ⊗ c2 = Er (m1 ⊕ m2).
The first homomorphic encryption voting scheme was
proposed in [6]. For further references we refer to
[4],[8],[11],[12],[13].
Voting schemes based on mix-nets. Main idea of mix-nets is
to permute and modify some sequence of objects in order to
hide the correspondence between elements of the original and
the final sequence. Servers of mix networks encrypt, permute
and re-encrypt the sequences of input elements, it is crucial
that one of the servers must be trusted. See [1],[5],[7],[16].
Voting schemes based on anonymous channels. These
schemes are very popular in practice due to their efficiency
and their support for any type of encryption. Anonymous
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channels are used to conceal the identity of the sender.
Usually ballots and identifying material are passed through
anonymous channels. Schemes using anonymous channels
several times use blind signatures, [5],[1–3, 9, 10, 15].
1.1 Previous work
In traditional elections, a voting booth not only allow voters
to keep their vote secret, but it prevents vote-buying and coer-
cion. The notions of receipt-freeness and uncoercibility were in-
troduced by Benaloh and Tuinstra [6]. Roughly stated, receipt-
freeness is the inability of a voter prove to an adversary that
he voted in a particular manner, even if the voter wishes to do
so. For formal definition see [10]. The property of receipt-
freeness ensures that an attacker is not able to trace back voter’s
exact behaviour, therefore a vote-buyer (coercer) does not ob-
tain a reasonable proof. Hirt and Sako [12] showed that [6] does
not possess receipt-freeness and introduced a receipt-free voting
based on homomorphic encryption. Lee and Kim [13] proposed
a receipt-free version of [11] keeping optimal performance, pri-
vacy, robustness and universal verifiability. Sako and Kilien [7]
proposed a multi-authority receipt-free scheme applying a mix
network and also homomorphic encryption for tallying. Mix-net
is used for tallying in [16] and at some point during the voting
process voters post ballot to the bulletin board via anonymous
channel. In [16] property of coercion-resistance is introduced.
A coercion-resistant scheme gives a possibility for the voter to
cheat an adversary who instructs him to vote in a given manner,
but the adversary cannot determine whether the voter behaved
as instructed, even if the adversary asks the voter to divulge his
private keying material or to abstain from voting. Okamoto [9]
proposed a voting scheme which he himself later showed to lack
the postulated receipt-freeness, a repaired version using blind
signatures appears in [10].
Most of the receipt-free schemes in literature make some ba-
sic assumptions about the communication channel between the
voter and the election authorities. One of the physical assump-
tions is a voting booth [6] that allows a voter secretly and inter-
actively communicate with an authority. A weaker assumption
is an untappable channel [7,9,10,12] that is a one-way physical
apparatus providing perfect secrecy in an information-theoretic
sense. Several authors in the literature have pointed out the dif-
ficulty of their implementation. Untappable channels also force
voters to use specified voting locations.
In our scheme untappable channels or voting booth are
not employed, voters use anonymous channels [5] that can
be realized in practice using mix-nets. We do not rely on
tamper-resistant hardware [14] either in order to achieve receipt-
freeness. The proposed protocol does not require any complex
cryptographic primitives like zero-knowledge protocols, secret
sharing or threshold cryptosystems [8],[11],[4][16]. However, it
also provides basic requirements including coercion resistance,
verifiability, eligibility, unreusability and privacy.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Requirements
In order to be functional in practice, an electronic voting
scheme has to satisfy not only all the standard features of the
conventional paper-based voting methods, but also should pro-
vide more efficient voting services. E-voting comparing to the
traditional election allows adversaries to intrude the voting pro-
cess in an easier way, even if there is a small security gap in
the design. Thus the scheme should be protected against these
techniques, the requirements are as follows:
Eligibility. Only eligible voters can cast votes.
Privacy. All votes remain secret. No coalition of participants
not containing the voter himself can gain any information
about the voter’s vote.
Unreusability. Every eligible voter can cast only one vote.
Fairness. No participants can gain any knowledge about the
partial tally before the counting stage. Knowledge of any in-
termediate result about the election can influence the voters.
Robustness. No voter can disrupt the election, any invalid vote
will be detected and not counted in the final tally.
Individual verifiability. Each eligible voter should be able to
verify that his vote was committed as intended and made into
the final tally as cast.
Universal verifiability. Any participant or passive observer can
check that the election is fair, the final result is exactly the sum
of the votes.
Receipt-freeness, Uncoercibility. The voter cannot reveal his
ballot to any adversary. Before the election someone can
bribe the voter with a demand of casting his favourite vote.
Receipt-freeness avoids vote-buying. Uncoercibility means
that a voter cannot be forced into casting a particular vote
by an adversary. During the election a coercer can observe
the public information, the communication between the voter
and the authorities and can even order the voter how he should
behave during the voting process with generating him the ran-
dom bits.
Definition of receipt-freeness was introduced in [10]: Given
published information X (public parameters and information
on the bulletin board), adversary C interactively communicates
with a voter V in order to force V to cast C’s favourite vote
c∗ to an authority A, and finally C decides whether to accept
V iew(X : V ) or not, andA decides whether to accept c∗ or not.
The coercer gets any message from the bulletin board immedi-
ately after it is put on the board. V iew(X : V )means published
information X , c∗ and messages that C receives communicating
with V .
Definition 1. A voting system is receipt-free, if there exists a
voter V , such that for any adversary C can cast c (c , c∗)
which is accepted by the authority A under the condition that
V iew(X : V ) is accepted by C.
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There are several attacks that should be considered in case of
electronic voting. Several real-word attacks [16] are enumerated
below:
Randomization attack. An attacker coerces a voter to submit
randomly formed ballot. In this attack it is not possible to
learn what candidate the voter casts a ballot for. The effect of
this attack is to cancel the voter’s vote with large probability.
Forced-abstention attack. An attacker forces a voter to abstain
from voting. This attack happens if an adversary is able to
follow who is eligible for voting and who has already voted.
Being aware of this knowledge he threatens voters and effec-
tively excludes them from the voting process.
Simulation attack. In this attack an adversary coerces or bribes
the voter to reveal his private keying material and then pre-
tends to be the voter and casts his own favourite vote.
Definition 2. A scheme is called coercion-resistant if it offers
not only receipt-freeness, but also defense against randomiza-
tion, forced-abstention and simulation attacks.
2.2 Participants
Several participants contribute in an election system. If we
had one absolutely reliable authority we would need no more
authorities, and the voting process would be very simple. Since
the situation is different in practise, the responsibility should be
shared among several authorities. It is crucial to consider how
much a participant can be trusted. Besides voters only two au-
thorities are necessary for the proposed scheme.
Voters. Let denote voters by V = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn}. A voter
wants to have the guarantee that his vote is counted in the final
tally and if a fraud is suspected there should be a possibility
to make his claim. Authorities do not trust voters at all.
Registry. Denoted by R, this authority is responsible for gen-
erating private and public keying material, all the information
sufficient for voters and the authority in order to complete the
voting process. At the end of the process the Registry pub-
lishes the final tally.
Voting Authority. Denoted byA, this authority is charged with
processing ballots. In essence the Voting Authority manages
the election. Voting Authority can also act as a voter.
2.3 Channels
In the proposed scheme various types of communication
channels are used. Since this scheme is designed for a real-world
environment untappable channel and voting booth are avoided,
because of the difficulty of their implementation.
Public channel. Any participant can send a message to any
other participant through a public channel. Message sent
through this channel can be tapped, and the identity of the
sender can be traced back.
Anonymous channel. This channel guarantees the anonymity
of the sender. Receiver of the message that has been sent
through anonymous channel does not have any information
about the identity of the sender. Realization of this channel is
described in [5] based on a mix-net approach.
Bulletin board. Bulletin board (BB) is publicly readable. The
Registry can write, and nobody can delete or change anything
on it. Bulletin board can be considered as a public channel
with memory.
2.4 Assumptions
1 The security of the proposed scheme relies on the cor-
rectly generated public and secret key pairs for the voters
(PKV , SKV ) and for the Voting Authority (PKA, SKA), too.
It is also assumed that the Registry gives private key informa-
tion only to the proper participants.
2 Since the responsibility of the security is shared, we suppose
that the Registry and the Voting Authority do not collude.
They both follow the steps of the protocol, not providing more
information to each other that they are supposed to.
3 An adversary may coerce a voter to cast his vote in
a prescribed manner. He can request voter’s credential
(VI D, SKV ) right after the registration phase and dictates all
random parameters (x, a) for the voter.
4 We suppose that voters ‘personally’ participate in the election.
The adversary may not continuously watch over the shoul-
der of the voter, monitor his hard-drive, etc. During the vot-
ing there is a moment when the voter is alone and not being
watched. A coercer is able to communicate with a voter right
after the registration phase, and before and after the election.
5 The Voting Authority is honest in a sense that it does not
collaborate with an adversary, does not give any information
about the election and it does not generate spurious votes.
3 The Voting Scheme
3.1 Protocol description
The proposed election procedure consists of three distinctive
stages: Authorizing, Voting and Tallying.
During the Authorizing stage the voter authenticates himself
and receives his credentials, the Voting Authority gets the voter
roll containing the corresponding public keys and all system pa-
rameters are generated.
During the Voting stage voters create their ballots. Voting
Authority checks eligibility of the voters and if they have already
voted before. Voters receive their encrypted ballots signed by
the Voting Authority, if a fraud is detected the voter makes a
claim. At the end voters pass the corresponding decrypting keys
of the encrypted ballots to the Registry. Ballots and bulletin
board information are passed through an anonymous channel.
During the Tallying stage the Voting Authority sends en-
crypted ballots to the Registry. The ballots are being decrypted
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and the final results with the votes are listed on the bulletin
board. Voters confirm that their ballots are on the bulletin board.
If his ballot is not listed correctly, he makes a claim.
During the voting process public and anonymous channels are
used and encrypted messages are sent. For the communication
between the voters and the Voting Authority instead of higher
degree residue encryption the more efficient discrete logarithm
encryption is recommended. Let denote an encryption with pub-
lic key PK by EncPK .
Let define a candidate slate to be an ordered set of m distinct
identifiers {c1, c2, . . . , cm}, each of which corresponds to a voter
choice, typically a candidate or party name.
3.2 Functions
Several functions are applied in the proposed election scheme.
Let denote p a large prime and g an element of Z/pZ. The
details of these functions are as follows:
Voting. Function vote(VI D, SKV , x, a, c)  ballot takes
the voter’s identification number VI D , secret key SKV , vote
c and two randomly chosen parameters x, a as input and out-
puts the ballot. The form of the ballot is VI D||r ||y, where
r ≡ EncSKv (g)
y ≡ g−x (mod p)
and || is the notation of concatenation. This function gener-
ates the ballot itself being processed by the Voting Authority.
Eligibility. Function ifeligible(PKV , r)  {0, 1} takes the
voter’s public key PKV and the received element r as input.
It returns 1 if
DecPKV (r) ≡ g
and 0 if the congruence above is not satisfied. This function
checks if a voter is eligible for voting or not, i.e. if he pos-
sesses the proper private keying material VI D, SKV .
Verification. The function veri f y(r, z, s, y)  {0, 1} calcu-
lates if
r z ≡ gs · y (mod p)
congruence holds. It outputs 1 if it is correct and 0 otherwise.
This function verifies if s sent by the voter is calculated well
and by the same voter who previously voted with values y
and r , where element z is randomly generated by the Voting
Authority.
In the following we discuss each step in more details. Fig. 1
shows the steps of the voting protocol.
3.2.1 Authorizing stage
R −→ V : (VI D, SKV , PKA)
R −→ A : (VI D, PKV )
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Figure 1. The voting scheme
Voting Authority generates a random integer z, encrypts it with the voter’s public key and
sends it. After calculating
s ≡ x+ zSKV (mod q)
the voter concatenates it with VID and sends it to the Voting Authority using anonymous channel.
After receiving all the information the Voting Authority looks up r, z, y associated to VID and
runs function verify. If it returns 0, then the voter is disclosed from the election otherwise the
pair (s, v) is signed and sent back to the voter. After confirming the received signature the voter
sends it with the decrypting key a and s to the Registry. If a fraud is detected, then he sends
EncPKA(VID||r||y) through a public channel, EncPKA(s||v||z||VID) through an anonymous chan-
nel to the Voting Authority. Voting Authority makes sure of the existence of random parameter z
and corresponding values and after applying functions ifeligible and verify sends back Sign(s||v).
3.2.3. Tallying stage.
A −→ R : EncPKR(s||v)
R −→ BB : (s||c)
After the voting phase is finished the Registry receives (s||v) pairs from the Voting Authority,
checks validity of the signature received from the voter, computes c from v, publishes the pair
of (s, c) and the relevant voting statistics on BB. In this stage the voter confirms if his vote is
correctly listed on BB. If the pair (s, c) calculated by the voter is not on BB, then he sends
EncPKR(s||v||a||Sign(s||v)) through an anonymous channel.
3.3. Security analysis.
Theorem 3.1. The proposed e-voting scheme is secure, i.e. it satisfies eligibility, privacy, un-
reusability, fairness, robustness, individual and universal verifiability and coercion-resistance.
Proof. Eligibility. During the Authorizing stage a voter is registered only after identifying him-
self. Only eligible voters receive credential material. Voting Authority ensures eligibility before
accepting the ballot by running function ifeligible. The Voting Authority cannot impersonate
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Before the voting process the voter must register with Registry
verifying his identity. Registry issues a credential to each eli-
gible voter and prepares a list of registered voters. A creden-
tial consists of voter’s secret key SKV , an identification number
VI D , public key of the Voting uthority PKA. The voter roll
contains key pairs (VI D, PKV ), where PKV is the public key
of the corresp nding voter. This list is deliv red to the Voting
Authority. In this stage all public system parameters are gener-
ated and published, such as p, q large primes, where q|(p − 1)
and g ∈ Z/pZ of order q.
3.2.2 Voting stage
V −→ A : EncPK A (VI D||r ||y)
V −→ A : EncPK A (VI D||v)
A −→ V : EncPK V (z)
V −→ A : EncPK A (s||VI D)
A −→ V : Sign(s||v)
V −→ R : EncPKR (s||a||S gn(s||v))
The voter chooses random integers a, x , calculates his ballot
with function vote, encrypts it with the public key of the Vot-
ing Authority and sends it. The voter calculates
v ≡ ya · c (mod p)
concatenates VI D and v and passes it through an anonymous
channel. When the Voting Authority receives the message, de-
crypts it, according to VI D extracts PKV from the voter roll.
Giving PKV and r to function i f eligible as an input verifies
eligibility of the voter. If the voter is eligible for voting it stores
all the information, thus the authority can also find out if the
voter cast his vote before or not. If the voter is not eligible or
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has already cast his vote, the Voting Authority bars the voter out
of the election.
Voting Authority generates a random integer z, encrypts it
with the voter’s public key and sends it. After calculating
s ≡ x + zSKV (mod q)
the voter concatenates it with VI D and sends it to the Voting
Authority using anonymous channel.
After receiving all the information the Voting Authority looks
up r, z, y associated to VI D and runs function veri f y. If it
returns 0, then the voter is disclosed from the election other-
wise the pair (s, v) is signed and sent back to the voter. Af-
ter confirming the received signature the voter sends it with
the decrypting key a and s to the Registry. If a fraud is de-
tected, then he sends EncPKA (VI D||r ||y) through a public chan-
nel, EncPKA (s||v||z||VI D) through an anonymous channel to the
Voting Authority. Voting Authority makes sure of the existence
of random parameter z and corresponding values and after ap-
plying functions i f eligible and veri f y sends back Sign(s||v).
3.2.3 Tallying stage
A −→ R : EncPKR (s||v)
R −→ BB : (s||c)
After the voting phase is finished the Registry receives (s||v)
pairs from the Voting Authority, checks validity of the signature
received from the voter, computes c from v, publishes the pair
of (s, c) and the relevant voting statistics on BB. In this stage
the voter confirms if his vote is correctly listed on BB. If the
pair (s, c) calculated by the voter is not on BB, then he sends
EncPKR (s||v||a||Sign(s||v)) through an anonymous channel.
3.3 Security analysis
Theorem 3. The proposed e-voting scheme is secure, i.e. it sat-
isfies eligibility, privacy, unreusability, fairness, robustness, in-
dividual and universal verifiability and coercion-resistance.
Proof. Eligibility. During the Authorizing stage a voter is reg-
istered only after identifying himself. Only eligible voters re-
ceive credential material. Voting Authority ensures eligibility
before accepting the ballot by running function i f eligible.
The Voting Authority cannot impersonate an eligible voter
without the official credential issued by the Registry. There-
fore, the proposed scheme satisfies eligibility.
Privacy. The vote is encrypted during the process, only in the
Tallying stage it is decrypted by the secret key of the Reg-
istry. After revealing the votes on BB and assuming that the
Registry and the Voting Authority do not collude, nobody can
trace back the identity of the voter.
Unreusability. Each voter possesses different secret key and
VI D . If a voter tries to vote with the same credential again
the Voting Authority detects it since all the necessary values
are stored. Since he cannot generate any other voter’s creden-
tial, every eligible voter can cast a vote only once.
Fairness. Only in the Tallying stage votes are decrypted, and
final results are posted, thus during the voting phase no one
has information about any intermediate results.
Robustness. Invalid votes cast by malicious voters are detected
in the Tallying stage, after decrypting ballots. These (s, c)
pairs are marked as invalid by the Registry, or any party can
notice them and ask to do it. No coalition of voters can disrupt
the election.
Individual verifiability. In the Tallying stage if a voter cannot
find the proper (s, c) pair on BB makes a claim. Since the BB
is publicly readable voters can make sure of their own ballots.
A voter makes a claim in a way that he shows the signature
received and checked in the Voting stage.
Universal verifiability. The final tally and all the votes are
listed on BB. Anyone can check the correctness of the re-
sults, since BB is readable by everyone and not erasable or
changeable by anyone.
Receipt-freeness, Uncoercibility. The coerced voter V wants
to cast vote c, while the adversary C forces the voter to cast
his favourite vote c∗. Voter V calculates the necessary values
and functions with value c, follows the steps of the protocol,
thus A accepts v and sends (s, v) to R. At the same time V
states to C, he cast vote c∗.
In our scheme
V iew(X : V ) : {VI D, SKV , x, a, c∗, z∗, s∗}.
We assume C generates random integers x, a to V and right af-
ter the Authorization stage communicating with V coercer C
is aware of VI D, SKV . Using anonymous channels C cannot
trace back the message was passed by V to A or R, in other
words even if C calculates EncPK A (VI D||v), EncPK A (s||VI D)
and EncPK R (s||a||Sign(s||v)) is not able to control if V sent the
same messages or not. After the election V chooses an (s′, c′)
pair from BB, where c′ = c∗ and let s∗ = s′. It is assumed
that the moment when V receives z and calculates s the voter is
alone and not being watched, hence V can calculate and state to
C z∗, where
s∗ ≡ x + z∗SKV (mod q).
Since after verifying all the calculations C accepts V iew(X :
V ), therefore the proposed scheme is receipt-free and unco-
ercible.
Randomization attack. The randomization attack is prevented,
since adversary cannot coerce a voter to cast a different, ran-
domly formed, invalid vote. The adversary cannot verify if
the coerced voter has cast the prescribed vote or not.
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Forced-abstention attack. Even if an adversary can see the
voter roll, i.e. the list of registered voters, still he is not able to
verify if a certain voter has cast a vote or not. Assuming the
Voting Authority does not collude with the coercer, the only
information he has is on BB. It is not possible to find out the
voter from the listed pairs of (s, c).
Simulation attack. Even if a voter provides his private keying
material (VI D, SKV ) after the Authorizing stage and before
the Voting stage, he cannot be coerced by an adversary. An
attacker is not able to verify the correctness of the received
private keying material.
The proposed scheme satisfies receipt-freeness and protects
against randomization, forced-abstention and simulation attack,
therefore it is coercion-resistant.
4 Conclusions
The proposed protocol fulfils requirements for electronic
election schemes, such as eligibility, privacy, unreusability,
fairness, robustness, individual and global verifiability and
coercion-resistance. It is offered to employ it in a small-scale
practical environment (e.g. companies), where the authorities
participating do not collude and the voting authority do not col-
laborate with voters. No complex cryptographic primitives are
applied, besides easy calculations it computes digital signature
and for communication between the participants discrete loga-
rithm encryption (e.g. EL-Gamal) is recommended.
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